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6.1 Introduction
Korea’s economic development over the past twenty ﬁve years has been
based on industrialization, with priority being given to the manufacturing
sectors at the expense of services. However, since the ﬁnancial crisis of late
1997, the importance of the service sector has been increasingly recognized,
and comprehensive reforms in the service sector were recommended in or-
der to restore the crisis-ridden economy to its previous growth path (Mc-
Kinsey 1998).
The liberalization of services can bring potential gains in productivity in
service sectors that are subject to technology transfers and economies of
scale. These are similar to the productivity eﬀects of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in the manufacturing sector, because a signiﬁcant portion of
service supplies occurs through FDI. Various studies show positive evi-
dence of the productivity spillovers of FDI (Caves 1974; Globerman 1979;
Blomstrom and Persson 1983; Borensztein, de Gregorio, and Lee 1998).
Foreign investment may also raise productivity by enhancing competition.
Based on an analysis of approximately 670 U.K. companies, Nickell (1996)
showed that competition, as measured by increased numbers of competi-
tors or by lower levels of rents, is associated with a signiﬁcantly higher rate
of total factor productivity growth. Using ﬁrm-level panel data of U.S. au-
tomobile component manufacturers, Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung (1994)
found that productivity gains among the host country suppliers largely stem
from the increase in competition created by FDI.
Anecdotal evidence shows that foreign-invested ﬁrms may raise produc-
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contractors, bringing in new capital goods and technology, introducing ad-
vanced management know-how, conducting in-house research and devel-
opment, and enhancing competition (Kim and Hwang 2000, 272). Most of
these channels of raising productivity through FDI apply to both the man-
ufacturing and service sectors.
Moreover, the liberalization of trade in services may result in improved
productivity in other sectors, including manufacturing, due to the resulting
access to a broader variety, better quality, and lower cost of inputs. Using a
model of increasing returns due to specialization, Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-
Batiz (1992) argued that FDI in the business service sector stimulates spe-
cialization and raises the productivity of the industry that uses them.
Markusen (1989) also demonstrated that allowing trade in producer ser-
vices is superior to allowing trade in ﬁnal goods only, due to the comple-
mentarity between domestic and foreign producer services.
This paper investigates the changes in productivity growth rates of Ko-
rean service and manufacturing subsectors in relation to the liberalization
of trade in services. Since Korea underwent accelerated liberalization of the
service sector in the 1990s, we try to examine whether the service subsectors
that were liberalized and the manufacturing subsectors that use liberalized
services as inputs experienced productivity gains in this period.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 6.2 reviews the evolution of
liberalization in services in Korea as well as the recent trends of trade in ser-
vices. Section 6.3 illustrates the case of distribution services, which were lib-
eralized almost completely in the 1990s. Changes in productivity in the ser-
vice and manufacturing subsectors are explored in section 6.4 with a
tabulation of the trends of labor and total factor productivity. We then in-
vestigate whether liberalized service subsectors posted relatively higher pro-
ductivity growth and contributed to productivity gains in the manufactur-
ing subsectors. Concluding remarks and policy implications are provided in
section 6.5.
6.2 Evolution of Services Liberalization and 
Recent Trends of Trade in Services
6.2.1 Evolution of Services Liberalization
Unlike the manufacturing sector, in which FDI had been liberalized since
the early 1980s, much of the services liberalization has only taken place
since the mid-1990s. Table 6.1 shows that the Korean government has lib-
eralized 154 business categories (at the Korean standard industrial classiﬁ-
cation [KSIC] ﬁve-digit level) in the service sector, completely or partially,
since 1993. Many of these service subsectors were liberalized as a result of
180 Jong-Il Kim and June-Dong Kimthe Uruguay Round negotiations and Korea’s accession to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996. Addi-
tional liberalization took place after Korea suﬀered from economic crisis in
1997. In 1998, as a way of attracting more foreign investment and enhanc-
ing eﬃciency, the Korean government accelerated the liberalization of the
service sector beyond the level of its OECD and World Trade Organization
(WTO) commitments.
Comparison of service subsectors in which FDI was restricted as of Jan-
uary 1990 (table 6A.1) with those as of November 1997 (table 6A.2) shows
that distribution services, business services, entertainment and recreational
services, and other personal services have been liberalized since 1990. Also,
transportation services, ﬁnancial services, and telecommunication services
were partially liberalized during this period.
More drastic liberalization has been implemented since the ﬁnancial cri-
sis of late 1997. Twenty-two business categories, most of which are in the
service sector, including real estate rental and sales, land development, wa-
terworks, and investment companies, fully opened in 1998. By May 1999,
three more service business categories, the publishing of books, outer mar-
itime transportation, and the operation of casinos, fully opened. Further-
more, existing ceilings on foreign equity ratios were raised in 1999 in six
business categories: newspaper publishing, cable broadcasting, wire tele-
graph and telephone, and wireless telegraph and telephone.
As a result, only twenty four business categories in the service sector re-
mained to be completely liberalized as of May 2000. Among them, radio
and television broadcasting are the two categories in which FDI is wholly
restricted. Foreign direct investment in twenty two business categories, in-
cluding the publishing of newspapers, coastal water transport, air trans-
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Table 6.1 Korea’s FDI Liberalization, 1993–2000 (as of May 2000)
Liberalized
Remaining 
Classiﬁcation Total 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Restricted
Manufacturing 585 210612 20 0
Services 495 9 23 42 39 16 20 3 2 2 (22)
Others 68 5624 1 00 01 2 ( 2 )
Total 1,148a 16 30 44 49 27 22 5 3 4 (24)
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Five-Year Foreign Investment Liberalization Plan (various
years), and Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, Consolidated Public Notice for Foreign Invest-
ment (May 2000).
Notes: The business categories are at the Korean Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (KSIC) ﬁve-digit
level. “Others” denotes agriculture, ﬁsheries and mining. “Liberalized” includes both complete and par-
tial liberalization. The number of partially restricted business categories is in parentheses.
aBusiness categories that include government services and nonproﬁt organizations, where FDI is prohib-
ited by domestic law, are not counted.port, telecommunications, investment trust companies, and electric power
generation, are partially restricted (table 6.2).1
6.2.2 Recent Trends of Trade in Services
The service sector is gaining importance in the Korean economy, with its
share of GDP and employment having increased from 43.9 percent and 39.5
percent in 1980 to 52.7 percent and 59.8 percent in 1998, respectively. How-
ever, the share of the service sector in the domestic economy is lower than
that of the United States, Singapore, and Japan, where its portion of the
GDP in 1996 was 74.1 percent, 70.9 percent, and 64.4 percent, respectively.
Table 6.3 shows Korea’s trade in services by mode of supply in the 1990s.
The sum of exports and imports, of cross-border supply, which is measured
by commercial services in balance of payments (BOP), except for tourism,
increased from about $16 billion in 1991 to $39.6 billion in 1998. Trade in
services by the three modes of supply (cross-border supply, consumption
abroad, and movement of natural persons), except commercial presence,
increased from $22.8 billion in 1991 to $49 billion in 1998. In 1998, the to-
tal amount of Korea’s trade in services, except commercial presence, was al-
most 20 percent of the amount of trade in goods. The share in the world’s
total trade in services, except commercial presence, also rose from 1.2 per-
cent in 1991 to 1.8 percent in 1998.
Table 6.4 reveals that a signiﬁcant increase in trade in services has occurred
through commercial presence since the 1980s. Foreign direct investment in-
ﬂows in services increased from $1.6 billion in 1982–90 to $6.3 billion in
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Table 6.2 Service Business Categories in which FDI is Restricted, Korea 
(as of May 2000)
Wholly Restricted Partially Restricted
Radio broadcasting Wholesale of meats
Television broadcasting Publishing (newspapers, periodicals)
Processing of nuclear fuel
Electric power generation
Coastal water transport (passenger, freight)
Air transport (scheduled, non-scheduled)
Telecommunications (leased line, wired, 
mobile, cellular, resellers, other)
Domestic banking (special banking)
Investment trust companies
Program supplying
Cable broadcasting, satellite broadcasting
News agency activities
Radioactive waste disposal
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, Consolidated Public Notice for Foreign
Investment (May 2000).
1. Even though FDI in legal services is not restricted, foreign lawyers are not allowed to
practice unless they acquire a domestic license.1998–99. Hotels were the largest recipients through the 1980s. In the 1990s,
FDI increased remarkably in distribution services (wholesale and retail),
transportation services, ﬁnancial services, and other services, which are
mainly composed of telecommunication and business services. Foreign direct
investment in distribution services increased from $20.1 million in 1982–90 to
$586.6 million in 1996–97. Foreign direct investment in transportation ser-
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Table 6.3 Trade in Services by Modes of Supply, Korea: 1991, 1995, 1998 
(US$ millions)
1991 1995 1998
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Cross-border supplya 7,158 8,953 17,677 19,465 18,647 21,053
Transportation 3,873 4,897 9,272 9,645 10,204 8,983
Communications 353 204 561 642 656 1,133
Consumption abroadb 2,856 3,214 5,150 6,341 5,933 2,898
Commercial presence n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Movement of natural personsc 604 54 774 132 446 42
Total 10,618 12,221 23,601 25,938 25,026 23,993
(1.2) (1.3) (1.8) (2.0) (1.8) (1.7)
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (1999).
Note: Percentage shares in the world’s trade in services are in parentheses.
aBOP commercial services minus travel.
bBOP travel.
cBOP compensation of employees.
Table 6.4 FDI Inﬂows in Service Subsectors, Korea: 1962–99 (%)
Subsector 1962–81 1982–90 1991–95 1996–97 1998–99
Total FDI in services 
(US$ millions) 412.2 1,600.2 2,078.7 2,213.1 6,330.9
Electricity and gas 0 0 26.1 0 378.7
Construction 10.4 40.1 21.4 79.8 9.6
Wholesale and retail 0 20.1 103.4 586.6 956.7
Trading 0.4 55.5 394.7 306.5 336.1
Restaurants 0 4.2 60.2 7.1 9.4
Hotels 206.0 956.9 362.3 211.4 64.5
Transportation 28.7 9.6 9.9 150.2 9.4
Financial 109.7 384.9 710.3 480.8 2,292.9
Insurance 3.0 77.3 158.0 23.2 407.9
Real Estate 0 0 1.8 0.1 33.0
Others 53.9 51.4 230.5 367.4 1,832.5
Total FDI into Korea 
(US$ millions) 1,477.8 4,385.1 5,057.2 5,394.2 15,489.7
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, Trends in Foreign Direct Investment
(January 31, 2000).
Note: Based on actual investment.vices also increased, from $9.9 million in 1991–95 to $150.2 million in 1996–
97. Foreign direct investment in ﬁnancial services and other services experi-
enced a sharp increase after the ﬁnancial crisis. Foreign direct investment in
ﬁnancial services increased from $480.8 million in 1996–97 to $2.3 billion in
1998–99. The increase in FDI in other services was almost sixfold during the
same period, from $367.4 million in 1996–97 to $1.8 billion in 1998–99.
6.3 The Experience of Liberalization in Distribution Services
In this section, we focus on the distribution sector, which experienced sig-
niﬁcant liberalization during the 1990s, to illustrate how liberalization af-
fects the productivity of a speciﬁc sector.
Distribution services had been one of the least developed sectors in Ko-
rea up to the mid-1990s, along with ﬁnancial services. Mom-and-pop stores
having fewer than ﬁve employees accounted for approximately 80 percent
of Korea’s $116 billion retail market in 1996. The productivity of Korea’s
wholesale and retail service sector, in terms of sales per establishment or
sales per employee, was far below that of Japan in 1994 (table 6.5).
We may attribute the low productivity of Korean distribution services to
the regulations on zoning and land development and to the restrictions on
FDI. The regulations on zoning and land development reduced the avail-
ability of land, limiting the scale of operation, and the restrictions on FDI
prevented exposure to foreign best practices.2
However, a remarkable transformation has taken place in Korea’s distri-
bution industry since the government lifted some of the restrictions that
kept foreign service suppliers out of the country before 1996 (table 6.6).3 In
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Table 6.5 Comparison of Productivity in Distribution Services, Korea and Japan:
1994 (US$ thousands)
Wholesale Retail
Korea Japan Korea Japan
Sales per establishment 693 11,724 117.8 935.2
Sales per employee 170 1,099 57.8 190.0
Source: National Statistical Ofﬁce, R.O.K., Annual Report on the Survey of Wholesale and Re-
tail Trade as of 1994, and Ministry of Industry and Trade, Japan, Annual Statistical Report of
Commerce in 1994.
Note: Applied exchange rates are US 1$ = 716.4 Korean won; US 1$ = 102.18 Japanese yen.
2. In terms of deregulation of zoning, the semiagricultural and forest areas were redeﬁned
to allow retail stores occupying less than 30,000 square meters to be built in 1993. In 1996, large
discount retailers under 10,000 square meters were allowed to do business in the green areas,
where development is regulated by the law. The objective was to promote discount stores
(Mckinsey 1998).
3. In most of the service subsectors, the Korean government implemented domestic deregula-
tion and external liberalization almost simultaneously. It used external commitment to liberaliza-
tion in reducing any opposition or resistance to domestic deregulation or implemented domesticLiberalization and Productivity Growth in Korea 185
Table 6.6 Liberalization of Distribution Services, Korea: 1989–2000
Year Liberalization Measures
1989 Allow FDI in wholesale of medicine
Expand permissible imports by branches of foreign companies
1991 Allow FDI in retailing, up to 10 stores of 1,000 m2 or less for each foreign-invested
company
1993 Expand store and space-related limits to 20 stores of 3,000 m2 or less for each
company
1996 Eliminate requirements on the number of stores and space (allowed establishment
of hyper-markets)
Liberalize 5 business categories, including commodity chains, and the retailing of
meat
1997 Liberalize 10 business categories, including general trading and the retailing of
grain
1998 Abolish economic needs tests on department stores and shopping centers
Liberalize operation of gas stations
2000 Allow FDI in the wholesaling of meat
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy, Department of Distribution.
particular, store and space-related limits on retailing were eliminated for
both domestic and foreign retail ﬁrms. As a result, a number of large-sized
discount stores or hypermarkets have been established by both domestic
and foreign ﬁrms since 1996. The total number of hypermarket stores
reached 164 in 2000, and almost 30 percent of them have been established
by foreign ﬁrms (table 6.7).
Table 6.7 Trends in the Establishment of Hyper-markets in Korea: 1997–2000
Number of Stores
Name Year of Entrya 1997 1998 1999 2000
Carrefour 1996 3 6 11 20
Wal-Mart 1996 4 4 5 10
Costco 1998(1994) 2 3 3 5
Promodes 1999 — — 2 5
Tesco 1999(1997) 1 1 2 7
Total for foreign companiesb —1 0 1 4 2 34 7
(15%) (16%) (20%) (29%)
Total for Korean companiesb —5 5 7 4 9 2 117
(85%) (84%) (80%) (71%)
Total — 65 88 115 164
Source:Korean Association of Retailers, Management Revolution in 21st-Century Asian Retail-
ing (December 27, 1999).
aEntry year of the acquired local company in parentheses.
bShares in total number of stores in parentheses.
deregulation to help domestic ﬁrms establish market position before foreign penetration. Hence,
it is diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate the impact of domestic deregulation from external liberalization.The increasing number of hypermarkets is changing the manufacturer-
dominated structure of the Korean retail industry, which had deterred pro-
ductivity improvements and price competition. The increased buying power
of the hypermarkets puts price determining in the hands of retailers rather
than manufacturers, leading to price competition. Foreign retail ﬁrms also
transferred advanced techniques in merchandising and inventory manage-
ment as well as new technologies such as point of sales (POS) systems.
Table 6.8 presents the change in number of establishments per 1,000 res-
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Table 6.8 Trends in the Sizes of Establishments in Distribution Services, 
Korea and Japan: 1982–98
Korea Japan
Year Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail
Number of Establishments per 1000 Residents
1982 1.2 13.8 3.3 14.5
1985 — — 3.1 13.5
1986 1.7 15.5 — —
1988 1.9 16.0 — —
1990 2.1 16.6 3.8 12.8
1992 2.6 16.9 — —
1994 2.7 17.0 — —
1996 3.2 16.9 — —
1998 3.1 15.6 — —
Workers per Establishment
1982 3.8 1.7 9.3 3.7
1985 — — 9.4 3.9
1986 5.0 1.9 — —
1988 5.4 1.9 — —
1990 5.5 1.9 — —
1992 4.7 1.9 — —
1994 5.1 2.0 — —
1996 4.3 2.1 — —
1998 4.2 2.0 — —
Floor Space per Establishment (m2)
1982 — — — 55.4




1992 75.7 35.6 — —
1994 92.7 38.7 — —
1996 129.4 45.8 — —
1998 136.4 52.8 — —
Sources: The data on Korea are constructed from various issues of the Annual Report on the
Survey of Wholesale and Retail Trade,published by the Korean National Statistical Ofﬁce. The
data on Japan are from Ito and Maruyama (1991) and Anwar and Taku (1993).
Note: Dashes indicate that data are not available.idents, workers per establishment, and ﬂoor space per establishment since
1982. The Korean distribution sector has experienced growth in terms of
number of establishments as well as the size of establishments. Particularly,
the number of wholesale establishments has grown quickly from 1.2 per
1,000 residents in 1982 to 3.1 in 1998. The number of retail stores reached
16.6 per 1,000 residents in 1990, far surpassing Japan. Although the Japan-
ese distribution sector is accused of ineﬃciency due to the presence of many
small establishments, the Korean distribution sector may be regarded as
worse, with much smaller establishments in terms of size.4 However, in the
mid-1990s, the number of establishments in retailing began to decline, while
the size continued to grow. During this period, the domestic retailing sector
began to be exposed to foreign competition as foreign ﬁrms started to enter
the market, as shown in table 6.7.
Figure 6.1 decomposes the growth of sales into the growth of the number
of establishments and the growth of sales per establishment. The total
amount of sales has grown steadily except for the period 1996–98, when Ko-
rea fell into a severe recession due to the ﬁnancial crisis. In wholesale ser-
vices, the opening of new establishments contributed to the growth of sales.
However, in retail services, the growth of sales came largely from the growth
of sales per establishment. Particularly, in contrast to the wholesale sector,
opening of new retail stores slowed down in the 1990s, and the number of
establishments even declined from 1996 to 1998.
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show sales per employee and sales per establish-
ment. The sales per employee and sales per establishment, which are
widely used as measures of productivity and eﬃciency of the distribution
system, show that the productivity of the Korean distribution sector has
continually increased over time. Sales per both worker and establishment
increased notably in 1996, which may be a result of the service liberaliza-
tion and resulting FDI inflow. However, we have to wait to see whether
this trend will continue after the economy recovers from the deep reces-
sion of 1998.
Figure 6.4 breaks down the sales per employee of retail stores according
to their size. It shows that sales per employee of large retail stores, with ﬁve
or more employees, recorded a noticeable increase in 1998, whereas sales
per employee of small retail stores, with fewer than ﬁve employees, have
been stagnant since 1996. This may be because liberalization of the retail
sector brought about enhanced competition in the large-sized retail stores
through the establishment of hypermarkets by foreign retailers. The role of
liberalization in enhancing competition may be ascertained by the lower
price margins of the supermarkets and department stores, from 17.8 per-
cent and 24.2 percent in 1995 to 13.6 percent and 21.7 percent in 1998, re-
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4. For a discussion of the eﬃciency of the Japanese distribution system, see Ito and
Maruyama (1991) and Anwar and Taku (1993).Fig. 6.1 Decomposition of sales growth in distribution services, Korea (1979–98)
Source: National Statistical Oﬃce, Republic of Korea, “Annual Report on the Survey of
Wholesale and Retail Trade,” various years.
Note: The amount of sales is deﬂated using the producer and consumer price index for
wholesale and retail, respectively.
spectively (table 6.9). This reveals that supermarkets and department stores
face direct challenges from foreign competitors. 
In sum, a rough observation of the measures of eﬃciency points to en-
hanced productivity of the Korean distribution services with liberalization
in the 1990s, although we cannot provide deﬁnite evidence due to the lim-
ited data. Particularly, the inﬂow of FDI with the opening of hypermarketsFig. 6.3 Sales per establishment in distribution services, Korea (1979–98)
Source: See ﬁgure 6.1 note
Note: See ﬁgure 6.1 note
Fig. 6.4 Sales per employee in small and large-sized retail stores, Korea (1989–98)
Source: National Statistical Oﬃce, Republic of Korea, “Annual Report on the Survey of
Wholesale and Retail Trade,” various years.
Note: Numbers are millions of won.
Fig. 6.2 Sales per employee in distribution services, Korea (1979–98)by foreign ﬁrms introduced best practices management and challenged do-
mestic retail stores. In addition, changing shopping patterns with the intro-
duction of discount stores may have forced many small stores to specialize
their services and existing domestic retail ﬁrms to enlarge their size to take
advantage of the scale eﬀect.
6.4 Changes in Productivity Growth Rates5
This section investigates whether the productivity changes in the service
and manufacturing sectors in the 1990s were associated with services liberal-
ization. Even though there are many problems in measuring the output of
services, we follow the traditional approach by using the value added as the
measure of output. The reason is as follows: ﬁrst, the production of services
covers a wide range of heterogeneous activities. As frequently mentioned by
many authors such as Griliches (1992) and Triplett and Bosworth (2000),
each service industry contains its own unique problem of measuring output,
which makes a treatment applicable to all services almost impossible. Second,
recent studies approach the issue with sector-speciﬁc data sets by utilizing a
wide variety of methodologies. Thus, the productivity changes of diﬀerent
services calculated in various ways are not directly comparable. Third, unlike
manufacturing, services are considerably backward in the availability of reli-
able data, which is particularly the case in Korea. Given the constraints of
data, we simply utilize the data from national accounts as a last resort.
We ﬁrst compare the level of labor productivity of the Korean service in-
dustry with that of some of the advanced countries. The growth rates of labor
productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) in the Korean service sector
since 1970 are then examined. Finally, we will try to see whether productivity
growth in the manufacturing sector is associated with services liberalization.
6.4.1 Sectoral Labor Productivity: An International Comparison
In table 6.10, we compare the levels of labor productivity in Korea with
those of some developed countries in 1990. Labor productivity is calculated
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Table 6.9 Price Margin Trends for Supermarkets and Department Stores, Korea:
1995–98 (%)
1995 1996 1997 1998 Change in 1995–98
Supermarkets 17.8 16.1 15.0 13.6 –4.2
Department stores 24.2 24.8 22.6 21.7 –2.5
Source: Bank of Korea, Impact of Changes in Distribution Structure on Price Levels (26 Janu-
ary 2000).
5. The data used for this section are described in the appendix.as the value added per worker. For the Group of Five (G5) countries, the
value added is converted, for comparison, by using the 1985 purchasing
power parity exchange rates. Because the purchasing power parity ex-
change rate for each sector is not available for Korea, we convert the labor
productivity of Korea by using the average market exchange rate for the pe-
riod 1980–90.
Table 6.10 shows that in 1990 the labor productivity of the Korean service
sector, except for “utilities,” was much lower than that of the United States,
the European countries, and Japan. The labor productivity of “construction”
and “ﬁnance, etc.” in Korea was about 40 percent that of the United States.
Even worse was the labor productivity of “distribution, etc.” and “social ser-
vices, etc.,” which was 18 percent and 15 percent of U.S. levels, respectively.
6.4.2 Productivity Growth in Services
Table 6.11 tabulates the growth rates of labor productivity in the Korean
service subsectors since 1970. “Finance, etc.,” practically closed to foreign
suppliers until the late 1990s, experienced the worst performance, with neg-
ative growth rates in labor productivity throughout the period, except for
1985–90. It was during this period that the Korean economy was booming
with a large trade surplus. However, “distribution, etc.,” which was almost
completely liberalized in 1996, and “transport and communication,” which
was partially liberalized in the 1990s, showed increases in labor productiv-
ity in the late 1990s, from 5.09 percent and 0.41 percent in 1990–95 to 7.17
percent and 1.54 percent in 1995–97, respectively.
Because labor productivity is inﬂuenced by the magnitude of capital,
which is aﬀected by FDI inﬂows, we next compare changes in TFP in the
same period.
Total factor productivity is deﬁned as
TFP   
K L
Y
1    
where Y, K, and L are output, capital, and labor inputs, respectively, and  
is the elasticity of the production of capital. Thus, TFP growth is calculated
as the residual of output growth net of the weighted growth of factor inputs.
The underlying assumption is to use the factor shares in total costs as fac-
tor weights under constant returns to scale, Hicks neutral technical pro-
gress, and the proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms in competitive markets. In our
study, we consider two inputs, capital and labor.
It is desirable to adjust capital and labor inputs by their quality mea-
sures.However, the data on the quality of inputs at the sectoral level are not
available. We use gross ﬁxed capital stock for capital inputs and total
employment for labor inputs. It is also desirable to have actually utilized



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.input levels by using working hours and utilized capital. However, the data
on hours worked, both for capital and labor, are limited in their use for our
purposes. Regarding working hours, the published data concern the hours
paid rather than hours actually worked. Also, the capacity utilization rate
at the subsector level is not available, particularly for the service sectors.
Therefore, due to the failure to allow for cyclical variations in hours worked
and capacity utilization, there is a cyclical bias to our measurements of TFP
growth in the short run. However, this problem is lessened in the long run
by the booms’ being oﬀset by recessions.
Table 6.12shows that similar patterns can be detected for changes in TFP.
As was the case for labor productivity, “ﬁnance, etc.” recorded negative
TFP growth rates throughout the period, except for 1985–90. “Transport
and communications” showed a gain in TFP growth in the late 1990s, from
2.2 percent in 1990–95 to 4.12 percent in 1995–97. The trend of TFP growth
in “distribution, etc.” also improved in the late 1990s, from –0.41 percent in
1990–95 to –0.02 percent in 1995–97.
However, we cannot strictly prove that productivity improvement was
caused by liberalization in services from the trend of labor productivity and
TFP growth. As already mentioned, the two measures of eﬃciency consid-
ered above are subject to cyclical ﬂuctuations, and there may be a time lag
for the liberalization measure to take eﬀect in a sector-wide productivity
change. Considering that meaningful liberalization in the Korean service
sectors has only been implemented since the mid-1990s, it may be too early
to demonstrate any causal relationship between productivity changes and
services liberalization.
6.4.3 Contribution of Services Liberalization to Manufacturing
The hypothesis that liberalization in services may increase the productiv-
ity of manufacturing subsectors that use liberalized services as inputs can
be examined by comparing the productivity growth rates of manufacturing
subsectors (table 6.13) and the input coeﬃcients of services to those manu-
facturing subsectors (table 6.14).
For “nonmetals,” which had a negative TFP growth rate of –0.06 percent
in 1990–97, we can notice that the input coeﬃcient of distribution services,
which were liberalized in the 1990s, was 0.018, relatively lower than the in-
put coeﬃcients of the other service subsectors. Thus, “nonmetals,” which
uses the liberalized service subsector less intensively, shows poor perfor-
mance in terms of TFP growth rates when compared with other manufac-
turing subsectors.
However, it seems to be diﬃcult to extract any consistent pattern from the
growth rates of the TFP in the manufacturing subsectors and the input co-
eﬃcients of the service subsectors. In general, the sum of the input coeﬃcients
of services in the manufacturing subsectors is in the range of 0.1 to 0.17,
which is not large enough to make a signiﬁcant impact on their productivity.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Due to industrialization that gave priority to manufacturing at the ex-
pense of services, the service sector in Korea was grossly underdeveloped
prior to the early 1990s. Numerous sector-speciﬁc regulations and restric-
tions on FDI prevented competition and impeded the oﬀering of higher-
value services. In 1990, the labor productivity of the Korean service sub-
sectors was much lower than that of the advanced countries. The labor
productivity of “distribution services, etc.,” in particular, was less than one-
ﬁfth that of the United States in 1990.
Since the mid-1990s, the Uruguay Round negotiations and accession to
the OECD enabled the Korean government to gradually open the service
sector to foreign suppliers. The ﬁnancial crisis of late 1997 resulted in the
Korean service sector’s becoming almost completely open, except for a few
areas sensitive to national security, culture, and political stability.
The liberalization of services is presumed to bring productivity gains in the
service sector and also in manufacturing sectors that use liberalized services
as inputs. In searching for some evidence of this in Korea, we examined the
changes in productivity of the service and manufacturing subsectors in 1970–
97. Because liberalization took place in the 1990s and it takes time to see the
full eﬀects of liberalization, it is too early to give a deﬁnite answer to whether
liberalization in services has caused an increase in productivity in Korea.
However, we see a productivity improvement in such sectors as distribution
services, which had a large inﬂow of FDI due to liberalization in the 1990s.
Appendix
Sources of Data
The sectors considered were selected on the basis of their availability for
output and factor use. The sector classiﬁcation used was the International
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation System. Output was measured as value
added in constant prices, the data for which were obtained from the na-
tional accounts of Korea collected by the Bank of Korea.
The labor input is measured as total employment. The Annual Report on
the Economically Active Population Survey (AREAPS) provides the data
on total employment. However, AREAPS does not classify most of the ser-
vice subsectors for periods earlier than 1991.6 Thus, we computed the ratio
for each service subsector based on the data from the Statistical Yearbook
of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the employment tables
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6. The Annual Report on the Economically Active Population Survey currently classiﬁes
service sectors as electricity, gas, and water; retail and wholesale trade, restaurants, and hotels;
transport, storage, and communications; ﬁnancial institutions, insurance, real estate, and
business services; and community, social, and personal services.of the Bank of Korea and estimated the total employment for each subsec-
tor by applying the computed ratio to the total employment of the service
sector of AREAPS.
Capital input is deﬁned as gross ﬁxed capital stock and was computed by
applying the perpetual inventory method (PIM) to the data on the gross
ﬁxed capital formation of each industry in constant prices obtained from
the national accounts. To use the PIM, we need data on benchmark capital
stock and the depreciation rate. However, reliable data on these two vari-
ables are not available. Therefore, we extrapolated the gross ﬁxed capital
formation back to 1930 based on the time trend from 1953 to 1960 to avoid
the problem of benchmark capital stock and accumulated the investment
from 1930.7For the depreciation rate for each industry, we used the average
rates of the corresponding Japanese industries, calculated from the Inter-
national Sectoral Database (ISDB) published by the OECD, under the as-
sumption that the structure of the Korean economy is most similar to Japan
among the developed countries covered by the ISDB.
Finally, to compute the TFP, we need data on the share of labor in value
added. The labor share is calculated by dividing the compensation of labor
by value added. Because the data on the compensation of employees from
the national accounts do not include the compensation of self-employed la-
bor, we adjusted the compensation of employees under the assumption that
the compensation of the self-employed is comparable to that of the em-
ployed. That is, 
The share of labor in value added   (compensation of employees 
  [compensation of employees/total employees] 
  [total employment   total employees])/value added.
The data on the compensation of employees and current value added are
taken from the National Accounts. The number of total employees is taken
from the ILO Statistical Yearbook and the employment tables of the Bank
of Korea. The share of agriculture and ﬁsheries; community, social, and
personal services; retail and wholesale trade; and restaurants and hotels,
computed as above, are too high. The employment in these industries shows
that a large proportion of unpaid family workers may be underemployed.
Thus, when comparing them with some of the advanced countries from the
ISDB, we assumed that the unpaid workers were compensated at half the
rate of paid workers. After adjustment, the shares of labor in value added
for these industries were comparable to the estimate of Kim and Park
(1985).
Finally, the data on some of the advanced countries used for international
comparison were taken from the ISDB of the OECD, which provides sec-
toral output and input data of OECD countries from 1970 to 1990.
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7. We assumed the investment to be zero between 1950 and 1952 during the Korean War.Table 6A.1 Service Subsectors in which FDI is Restricted (as of January 1990)
Wholly Restricted Partially Restricted
Production, collection and distribution of 
electricity
Publishing (newspapers, periodicals and books)






Post and courier activities
Telecommunications
News agency activities
Radio and television broadcasting
Gambling
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Five-Year Foreign Investment Liberalization Plan (various
years)
Note: In KSIC three-digit level.
Wholesale of agricultural raw materials, live
animals, food, beverages and tobacco
Wholesale of household goods (medical goods
and cosmetics)
Wholesale of nonagricultural intermediate
products, waste and scrap (fertilizers)
Other wholesale (foreign trade brokers)
Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in
specialized stores
Other retail trade of new goods in specialized
stores
Land transport
Sea and coastal water transport
Inland water transport
Travel agencies
General ﬁnancial intermediation (banking)
Other ﬁnancial intermediation (investment, trust,
securities)
Insurance and pension funding
Real estate rental and development
Renting of other machinery and equipment
(construction equipment)
Research and experimental development on
social sciences and humanities
Legal, accounting, bookkeeping and auditing
activities; tax consultancy; market research and
public opinion polling; business and
management consultancy
Advertising
Other business services (personnel supply
services, investigation and security activities)




Motion pictures and other entertainment
activities
Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural
activities
Sporting and other recreational activities
Other service activities (barber and beauty shops,
wedding chapels, etc.)
Other recreational activities (parks, beaches, etc.)
Personal services (tutoring, housekeeping, etc.)References
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Gambling electricity
Publishing (newspapers, periodical and 
books)
Other retail trade of new goods in 
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Land transport




General ﬁnancial intermediation (banking)
Other ﬁnancial intermediation (investment, 
trust, securities)
Insurance and pension funding
Real estate rental and development
Credit information agency
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Comment Kazumasa Iwata
The paper investigates the impacts of service liberalization, notably estab-
lishment trade through commercial presence, on productivity in Korea.
The authors found it premature to show empirical evidence on an increase
in productivity. They argue, however, that competition is enhanced, notably
in the distribution sector, which may lead to an increase in productivity.
The liberalization of services trade may increase productivity through a
number of channels. First, the establishment trade via commercial presence
brings about an increase in production and in management know-how and
imparts a productivity spillover eﬀect to the economy.
Second, the improved quality and diversiﬁed service with lower prices as
intermediate inputs (both embodied and disembodied) may improve the
productivity of the manufacturing sector. This constitutes the major source
of beneﬁt of developing countries that have a comparative disadvantage in
service trade.
Third, the liberalization of trade in services may enhance competition.
This implies that trade liberalization aﬀects the market structure in an econ-
omy. Although it does not exclude the case of foreign monopoly, the Korean
economy seems to prove that the domestic economy is large enough to per-
mit the commercial presence of foreign ﬁrms. We should recall that some
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stitute for antimonopoly law.
Fourth, the transmission of advanced knowledge through the joint re-
search and development and provision of licenses constitutes the channel-
of-productivity increase.
It is interesting to observe that in the case of Korea the establishment
trade in services has accelerated after the ﬁnancial crisis, despite the fact
that the massive inﬂow and subsequent outﬂow of capital disrupted the ﬁ-
nancial market. It seems important to pay due attention to the fact that the
ﬁnancial liberalization has been accompanied by over-investment by nonﬁ-
nancial ﬁrms and constituted the precondition to ﬁnancial crisis. The ab-
sence of appropriate prudential policy on ﬁnancial institutions’ ﬁnancial
trade liberalization may have had a destabilizing eﬀect on the economy. The
ﬁnancial disruption seemed to work to deepen the recession.
Table 6.9 provides an international comparison of sectoral labor produc-
tivity in 1990, whereas table 6.11 provides an interesting result on changes
in total factor productivity (TFP). It indicates an improvement of produc-
tivity in the service sector, notably in the transport and communication sec-
tor, in 1995–97, despite the recession. However, it is somewhat puzzling that
productivity in the ﬁnancial sector registered a negative rate of increase for
a long period of time, from 1970 to 1997. Further, I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to accept
the statement that the distribution sector shows an improvement in pro-
ductivity when I look at tables 6.10 and 6.11; the negative TFP growth is
recorded in 1995–97. In contrast, ﬁgure 6.1 points to an increase in sales per
employee, but it is not clear whether it implies a productivity gain. It seems
necessary to provide additional evidence to conﬁrm the productivity im-
provement in the distribution sector after 1996.
My ﬁrst comment is whether the productivity gain is attributable solely
to foreign direct investment. I suspect that domestic regulatory reform in
the communication sector, in addition to the distribution sector, may have
played an important role in increasing the productivity of almost all service
sectors. Liberalization of trade in service often takes place simultaneously
with domestic regulatory reform. Both promote competition and eﬃciency
in an economy. It is important to discriminate between the eﬀects of reduc-
tion in the domestic distortion and in the external distortion. Apparently,
services trade liberalization deals with the latter. It seems possible to trun-
cate the impact by employing some econometric methods, although note 2
mentions that it is diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between the impacts of domestic
deregulation and external liberalization.
For instance, it may be useful to apply the tariﬃcation to trade in ser-
vices, as argued by Deardorﬀ (2000), or develop the tax-equivalent mea-
sures in assessing external distortion, such as the exercise carried out by the
Australian Productivity Council.
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ity gain is due to the expansion of the production frontier or the shift of the
production point inside the existing production frontier to the more eﬃ-
cient point.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) implies an increase in capital accumula-
tion, coupled with transfer of management and reduction in external dis-
tortion, whereas domestic deregulation simply removes barriers and re-
duces domestic distortion. Thus, the increase in FDI is accompanied by the
expansion of production frontiers into the direction that the Rybczynski
theorem predicts. The lack of appropriate data may prevent judgment.
However, it may be useful to delineate the diﬀerence, at least conceptually,
because it relates to the issue on the order of liberalization, notably with re-
spect to ﬁnancial liberalization.
Third, I would like to know why the intermediate service inputs in total
intermediate inputs take on such a small share (0.15–0.17) in intermediate
inputs of the Korean manufacturing sector. In Japan the share ranges from
0.28 to 0.3 in 1995, whereas in the United States it is 0.32 in 1990. As is
shown by the simulation results in a paper presented at this conference by
Kun-Ming Chen and others (chap. 4 in this volume), the service inputs are
important not only for the development of the service sector but also for
strengthening the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. The smaller
share of intermediate service inputs implies a smaller impact (about half) of
liberalization of trade in services in the case of Korea, as compared with
other countries, such as Japan and the United States.
Fourth, the paper primarily concerns productivity. However, the beneﬁt
for consumers appears mainly through price reduction and diversiﬁcation
of services. The price diﬀerential between home and abroad and the com-
parison of cost structures provide additional information on domestic and
external distortion. It may be promising to employ cost function, instead of
production function, in continuing the analysis on changes in consumer
welfare by the liberalization of trade in services.
Fifth, despite the diﬃculty in the case of abnormal shocks like ﬁnancial
crises, it still seems important to make some cyclical adjustment to the la-
bor and total productivity changes, in order to assess the impact of liberal-
ization.
Finally, with respect to productivity changes in distribution sector, I ﬁnd
it more important to pay attention to the impact of information and
telecommunication innovation due to the regulatory reform; it contributes
to the expansion of production frontier due to the new innovation and the
network externality eﬀect. It may be noted that in the case of Japan the large
retail stores like Ito-Yokado intend to make new entry into banking busi-
ness specializing in payment services by utilizing both the physical and vir-
tual networks. Conversely, many banks attempt to enclose networks of con-
204 Jong-Il Kim and June-Dong Kimvenience stores. This attempt can enhance competition and bring about an
increase in productivity in ﬁnancial service.
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Comment Mahani Zainal-Abidin
The paper shows that Korea’s service sector liberalization began in the early
1990s with its commitment to the Uruguay Round negotiation and later
membership to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD). The pace of liberalization was further accelerated during the
East Asian Crisis, and by May 2000 only very few service industries had to-
tal or partial restrictions (see table 6.2).
The paper suggests that liberalization of Korea’s service sector, which al-
lows for greater participation of foreign direct investment (FDI), will im-
prove productivity of liberalized service subsectors as well as of the manu-
facturing sector that uses the services of these subsectors.
My comments are as follows.
First, the main channel for productivity improvement put forward in this
paper is through higher participation of FDI that can inject technology
transfer and overcome economies of scale constraints. Increasing foreign
participation is one form of service sector liberalization. An equally impor-
tant form of liberalization concerns domestic service producers, namely,
the lowering of barriers to domestic producers through deregulation and
dismantling of regulatory impediments. These may take the form of what is
called in Kim’s paper barriers to ongoing operation or barriers that are de-
signed to protect incumbent ﬁrms.
The paper should describe more the measures of liberalization for do-
mestic service producers—for example, to what extent the Korean services
liberalization has removed entry and competition barriers. In other words,
to what extent is productivity improvement in the service subsector due to
the removal of barriers to ongoing operation of domestic services providers
vis-à-vis increased FDI participation?
For example, in Malaysia, productivity gains in service subsectors such
as telecommunications are substantially caused by deregulation of domes-
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tion in the industry.
Another form of services liberalization is through privatization. Most of
the services industries are publicly owned, and privatization of these activ-
ities since the late 1980s has allowed these services to be managed in a more
eﬃcient manner and has made cost and quality of service key in evaluating
their performance. As a result, there was a marked increase in the produc-
tivity of these privatized services. For example, parts of the health, educa-
tion, and water sectors have been privatized, and the ensuing higher pro-
ductivity has beneﬁted consumers and has attracted investments in these
sectors.
Second, I would like to comment on the calculation of service subsector
productivity.
The key problem in calculating service productivity is in determining a
suitable measure of output over time. This is complicated by two factors:
a) market prices may not be observable for publicly provided services, and
b) it is often diﬃcult to identify precisely what constitutes a service activity
in a particular industry and to account correctly for quality changes in ser-
vices.
The measurement of output requires identifying whether the output con-
sists of the transaction performed or the outcome achieved through the ser-
vice. A case in point is the ﬁnance subsector. The subsector experienced
negative growth rates in labor productivity throughout the 1970–97 period,
except for 1985–90. The period 1985–90, in which productivity rose sub-
stantially, was when the Korean economy boomed following the 1988
Olympic games. Thus, the increase in output of ﬁnance subsector was due
to bigger transaction volume and not improvement in services. Further, the
ﬁnance sector oﬀers a variety of activities that may increase its output (rev-
enue) by expanding the scope of ﬁnancial transactions, and this higher rev-
enue may not come from improvement in service.
The measurement diﬃculties are further aggravated by contributions
made by technology. In some services, such as distribution, telecommuni-
cation, and parts of the ﬁnancial service industry, technological change has
strongly aﬀected the production process and the organization of produc-
tion. This has contributed to signiﬁcant improvements in productivity, but
this may not always be easy to measure.
To overcome these measurement problems, some studies have used the
growth rate of capital as a proxy for services output growth.
Third, I would like to comment on the contribution of services liberal-
ization to the manufacturing sector. 
The paper has produced two interesting tables: table 6.8, on annual aver-
age growth rates of total factor productivity in the manufacturing sector,
and table 6.9, on input coeﬃcients for selected manufacturing subsectors.
As contended by the paper, liberalization in service subsectors will beneﬁt
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through productivity improvements. The paper should explore and formal-
ize these links. These two tables have given the authors a good start, and this
work should be expanded to capture the links between service subsectors
and manufacturing industries.
Finally, the authors should be commended for initiating a study to esti-
mate productivity improvements in the service sectors, especially for the
distribution industry.
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